**Literature Review (Ordered as in GitHub based on paper title)**

**By David Zhu**

**Cavdar, Ayser 2016:**

Not much empirical, some good notes.

AKP has promoted economic stability as their main policy platform, and housing policy of the AKP shapes lower class families’ dependence from the financial system and the government party. Cavdar believe that TOKI contributes to political loyalty on two levels: first, providing both houses and loans to the families of the lower and middle classes, and second, detaching the new house-owners from their existing urban networks by moving them to new living areas.

…

Since 2013, the TOKI refers to Law No. 6306 in the transformation projects in gecekondu neighborhoods. This law gives greater power to the TOKI and municipalities to force the dwellers to evacuate their places. According to this law, when the government declares an area as ‘vulnerable to natural disasters’, the house owners have to conclude a contract with either TOKI or construction companies to rebuild their houses; if they do not conclude a contract, the TOKI has the authority to expropriate their property in the name of the ‘public good’.

There were many claims from opposition parties about how the AKP government uses its authority over TOKI and TOKI’s housing developments to increase its votes. For instance, with the June 2015 elections approaching, the CHP, as the main opposition party, claimed that most of the housing developments of TOKI are planned for those places where the AKP has relatively more votes (Lıcalı 2014).

“The TOKI Administration told us in the meetings before the last elections: ‘If stability is over, if the AKP cannot make a single party government, your payments will increase dramatically. Look at how currency and interest rates boomed. You bought your houses with difficulties. If you make a mistake you’ll lose your houses.’”

“If I don’t exist, there is no economic stability for the nation, and no future for you.”

**Luca (Cam DPIS and LSE Middle East Centre) and Rodriguez-Pose (LSE Geo), 2019.**

Notes: Both authors are from LSE.

If the incumbents attempt to build a state–party image, they may decide to broaden the territorial targeting of public goods and to even target some of the opposition constituencies.

Methods: fixed effect (FE), Tobit and instrumental variables (IV) estimators on a data set on the allocation of public transportation investment to Turkey’s 81 provinces over the period 2003–14 with 31 in-depth interviews carried out among Turkey’s central bureaucracy.

Results: results provide robust evidence about how the growing power by the Turkish government is associated with a shift in the allocation of transport investment from a strategy exclusively aimed at punishing the main secularist opposition and, partly, at cementing core votes in areas with higher ‘electoral clout’, to one more focused on broadening the incumbent party’s electoral base and, likely, displaying its grand vision of Turkey’s ‘new path’. The analysis uncovers a reduction in the use of public investment as a tool to punish strategically constituencies voting for the pro-Kurdish BDP. The preferential targeting of Kurdish areas was temporary and may have significantly reduced since the collapse of the ‘democratic opening’ between the AKP and Kurdish groups in 2015 (Kaya & Whiting, 2019),

Model asumptions: Following the theoretical predictions for a close-list, PR electoral system (Golden & Picci, 2008; McGillivray, 2004), we build our argument starting from a core-voter model, according to which strategic targeting is carried out to cement the support of core voters and to punish opponents.

Interesting variables: Transport investment, party vote shares, close race, population (density), car stock, provincial development index (from MSB), capital stock.

**Tribin 2014.**

Comments: Public goods are used to reward supporters, cash transfers are used to persuade voters.

**Curto-Grau, Sole-Olle, Sorribas-Navarro, 2018**

Comments: Rewards co-party winner, disappear for competitive election.

We draw on data on capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments during 1995–2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we document strong and robust effects. We find that a mayor belonging to the party of the regional president obtains twice the amount in grants received by an opposition’s mayor. This effect is much greater for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large margin, but it disappears for highly competitive elections.

**Marschall, Ayodogan, Bulut. 2016**

Comments: Mayoral elections.

We argue that the intensification of neo-liberal economic policies encouraged the AKP to seek alternative sources for distributive politics, which it found in Turkey's Mass Housing Administration (TOKI). Using political, economic, and socio-demographic data for 900 municipal districts in Turkey, we empirically analyze the relationship between TOKI financed housing projects and the AKP's success in the three mayoral elections between 2004 and 2014. Our results show that while traditional explanations of Turkish party voting account for some of the AKP's success, distributive politics in the form of TOKI housing projects is a stronger predictor of the party's durability.



